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 ABSTRACT 
 The justifi cation of the child’s right to know her origins and the fundamental 
interests underlying it have attracted a lot of attention in recent years. This 
article goes one step further and assesses that right’s enforcement in practice 
together with its guiding principles. It starts by restating what the right consists 
in and what interests it protects according to different international human 
rights instruments. It then reveals the confl icts of rights that lie at the heart of 
the implementation of the right to know and explain its complexity. After 
considering the competing interests present, the article argues that none of 
these interests and rights should be regarded as absolute and suggests ways in 
which they can be balanced against each other. The recent evolution in the 
European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) case law with its more nuanced 
balancing of the competing rights is contrasted with the Convention on the 
Rights of the Child (CRC)’s focus on the child’s paramount interest. The arti-
cle argues that these different approaches are refl ected in national legal orders 
in Europe. By tracing the origins of this divergence back to those confl icting 
international legal paradigms and by proposing abstract adjudication princi-
ples to guide the concrete balancing of competing rights, the article hopes to 
contribute to a better understanding and ultimate reconciliation of the child’s 
multiple identities  – social and biological. 
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 I N T R O D U C T I O N 
 The question whether a child has a right to know her biological or 
genetic origins is one of the hardest issues to have arisen over the past 
20 years. It is now broadly accepted that children who do not know one 
or both of their biological parents have a  ‘ vital interest ’ 1 to identify 
them. This is the case of all children whose biological parentage has 
been split from their social or even from their birth parentage. It suf-
fi ces to think of abandoned or displaced children, of adopted children, 
of children conceived by artifi cial insemination (AI) or of children 
born out of wedlock, who might have no social or even birth evidence 
of who their biological mother or father are. 
 Knowing one’s origins is something most of us who know our 
parents take for granted, but for those who do not, it is an interest 
which has only very recently been acknowledged legally by the recogni-
tion of a full-blown  right to know . This reluctance can be explained by 
the complexity of the issue. To start with, the situations in which a 
child’s interest to know may be violated are so diverse as to prevent a 
holistic solution. For instance, an adopted child’s relationship with her 
social or legal parents is different from an AI child’s relationship with 
her birth parents or that of a child born out of wedlock with her father. 
Moreover, the ethical and legal issues are complicated by confl icting 
technical, psychological and sociological considerations that make a 
global evaluation of the child’s situation diffi cult. Finally, and most 
importantly, the child’s right to know confl icts with other people’s 
rights as well as with public interests or even other interests of the 
child. One may think, for instance, of the competing rights to auton-
omy and privacy of the mother, the father, the adoptive parents or the 
gamete donor. All this has contributed to turning the topic of the 
child’s right to know her origins into a  ‘ Pandora’s Box ’ (see  Van Bueren, 
1995: 37 ). 
 These diffi culties have been confronted to a large extent in recent 
years. Whereas for a long time the right to know one’s origins only con-
cerned a small number of children, at least in western European socie-
ties, the number of such children has dramatically expanded, thus 
making the question more pressing. Because of the progress in bio-
genetics, a child may now be conceived in multiple ways. Another ele-
ment is the increase in so-called non-conventional families whether 
hetero- or homosexual and hence the many ways in which a child may 
now be born and raised. Finally, the progress made in genetic research 
has facilitated the formal identifi cation of a child’s parents. 
 The child’s right to know her origins is now broadly recognized and 
respected (see eg, Triselotsis, 1973;  O’Donovan, 1988 ;  Stewart, 1992 ; 
 Hodgson, 1993 ;  Van Bueren, 1995 ;  LeBlanc, 1995 ;  Freeman, 1996 ;  Masson 
and Harrison, 1996 ;  Fortin, 2003 ;  Besson, 2005a ). This has been brought 
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about through national constitutional and legislative guarantees in the 
late 1980s. It has been the case in the UK, starting with adopted chil-
dren in 1975 and fi nally extending the right to know to AI children in 
2005, and in Germany for all children since 1988. Switzerland started 
protecting AI children’s right to know in 1992 and fi nally extended the 
right to adopted and all other children in 2002, also making it an abso-
lute right of the child. By contrast, France still does not expressly pro-
tect the child’s right to know, even under the new 2002 legislation on 
anonymous birth ( ‘ accouchement sous X ’ ), and grants mothers, who have 
given birth anonymously, the right not to consent to the later release of 
identifying data. 
 The right to know has also been guaranteed, and this will be our 
object here, by international human rights law and in particular the 
ECtHR’s case law since 1989 based on the 1950 European Convention 
on Human Right, (ECHR), the 1989 Convention on the Rights of the 
Child (CRC) and the 1993 Hague Convention on the Protection of 
Children and Cooperation in respect of Intercountry Adoption. All three 
conventions deal more or less expressly with the right to know one’s 
origins, but the novelty of the CRC, and in particular of Articles 7 and 
8 CRC, was that the child’s right to know her parents  qua child, and not 
only later as an adult, was expressly recognized for the fi rst time. 2 
 In this article, I discuss not so much the justifi cation of the right to 
know one’s origins itself and the fundamental interests underlying it, 
but the principles guiding its enforcement. Despite the national and 
international recognition of the right to know one’s origins, impor-
tant disparities remain in the enforcement of the right between inter-
national regimes and in the national implementations of these regimes. 
These disparities have been discussed at length in recent years, mostly 
focusing on the contrast between social and biological identity. The 
result is usually a stark opposition between those who consider the child’s 
interest paramount and those who, on feminist or socio-cultural grounds, 
place the interest of the mother or of other concerned third parties fi rst. 
In order to reverse the long-lasting and unjustifi ed paramount impor-
tance given to the mother’s and others’ social interests, recent approaches 
have often granted the child’s interest absolute priority over those inter-
ests. 3 This is a mistake, I shall argue, as it has been done at the price of 
others’ rights and hence of the social dimension of a child’s identity (see 
eg,  O’Donovan, 1988 ;  Fortin, 2003: 383 ). 
 After a presentation of the different confl icting interests in presence 
in the right’s implementation, the article argues, from a legal perspec-
tive, 4 that none of these interests and rights should be regarded as abso-
lute and suggests ways in which they can be balanced against each other. 
It starts by presenting some defi nitions and distinctions pertaining to the 
child’s right to know her origins. The second section unpacks the confl ict 
between the child’s right to know and others’ rights, and in particular 
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the mother’s or the donor’s right to autonomy and privacy. There, I 
argue that solving those confl icts by giving priority to either rights con-
tradicts the way human rights work and that the concrete balancing of 
rights is inescapable. In the third section, guidance for the weighing of 
competing rights is sought within international human rights instru-
ments and the decisions of their international reviewing bodies. Most 
international texts and decisions do not, however, provide any defi nite 
guidance; they oscillate between giving priority to the child’s right or to 
the mother’s. This is the case, I argue, of the CRC and the absolute 
priority it gives to the child’s right to know. By contrast, recent develop-
ments in the ECtHR’s case law provide useful guiding principles in bal-
ancing the child’s right to know with others’ rights. As a result, the 
concretization of the right to know has been largely left to national law 
so far and state authorities benefi t from a broad margin of apprecia-
tion. The last section assesses the implementation of the right to know 
one’s origins in the four European countries mentioned before. The 
article ends with a proposal for balancing principles, procedures and 
authorities that enables the recognition of the child’s biological iden-
tity without negating the importance of her social ties. 
 1 .  P U T T I N G  F I R S T  T H I N G S  F I R S T :  D E F I N I T I O N  A N D 
D I S T I N C T I O N S 
 A. Defi nition 
 General defi nition 
 The right to know one’s  origins amounts to the right to know one’s par-
entage, ie, one’s biological family and ascendance, and one’s condi-
tions of birth. It protects each individual’s interest to identify where she 
comes from. 
 The interest to know one’s origins is usually regarded as suffi ciently 
fundamental or  ‘ vital ’ 5 to give rise to a human right (see  Freeman, 
1996 : 276 – 77;  Besson, 2005c: 422 – 24 ). It is indeed deemed an impor-
tant element in one’s psychological balance to know where one comes 
from. Every one of us has a right to truth and hence to truth about 
one’s origins (see eg,  O’Donovan, 1988 : 37 – 9;  Eekelaar, 2006: chap 3 ). 
Moreover, adopted or AI children, who depend on the goodwill of 
authorities or their social parents to know about their origins, suffer 
from discrimination by comparison to children whose social and 
genetic parents match, but also to other children whose social and bio-
logical parents differ. 6 Further subsidiary interests include the interest 
to know one’s medical history and the interest in ascertaining legal 
rights such as inheritance rights (see  O’Donovan, 1988 : 29 – 36; 
 Freeman, 1996: 277 – 79 ). 
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 The right to know one’s origins is a dimension of the broader right 
to ascertain and preserve one’s  identity . Identity is a complex concept, 
which unsurprisingly has never been defi ned legally. In a nutshell, and 
to quote Freeman, identity is  ‘ what we know and what we feel. It is an 
organizing framework for holding together our past and our present 
and it provides some anticipated shape to future life ’ ( Freeman, 1996 : 
290. See also  Masson and Harrison, 1996: 278 – 79 ). It covers all sorts of 
memberships and in particular biological membership, but also famil-
ial, social, cultural and political memberships (see  Stewart, 1992: 226 –
 27 ). The present article concentrates on biological membership and 
the right to know one’s genetic parentage. Different guarantees of that 
right may be found in international human rights instruments. When 
that right is not recognized directly as such, it is usually based on the 
child’s right to the respect of private life, to autonomy or freedom of 
expression. 
 The International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights 
 Although they do not guarantee the right to know one’s origins 
expressly, two articles in the 1966 International Covenant on Civil and 
Political Rights (ICCPR) should be mentioned: Articles 17 and 24, 
paragraphs 2 and 3. 
 In general, the right to know one’s origins is said to derive implicitly 
from the  right to privacy under Article 17 ( Detrick, 1999 : 145;  Nowak, 
2005: 432 ): 
 (1) No one shall be subjected to arbitrary or unlawful interference 
with his privacy, family, home or correspondence, nor to unlawful 
attacks on his honour and reputation. 
 (2) Everyone has the right to the protection of the law against such 
interference or attacks. 
 This provision is complemented by the  right to birth registration under 
Article 24. The right to be registered immediately after birth is crucial 
in many respects. It allows the child to become offi cial and is hence a 
condition for receiving many public benefi ts. It also enables the child 
to fi nd out about her origins later on (see  Nowak, 2005: 432 ). More-
over, the right to a name and a nationality are essential to the constitu-
tion and preservation of a child’s identity and are therefore protected 
expressly by Article 24 paras 2 and 3: 
 (2) Every child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall 
have a name. 
 (3) Every child has the right to acquire a nationality. 
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 The European Convention on Human Rights 
 Although it does not guarantee the right to know one’s origins expressly, 
one article should be mentioned in the 1950 ECHR: Article 8: 
 (1) Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, 
his home and his correspondence. 
 (2) There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exer-
cise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and 
is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national se-
curity, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for 
the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or 
morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others. 
 This article protects the  right to respect for one’s family and private life . 
The right to know one’s origins is an essential part of the respect of 
private life and has been derived by the ECtHR directly from Article 8 
ECHR since 1989. 7 The ECtHR does not, however, defi ne this right very 
precisely; the latter is said to cover the right to know one’s parents’ 
identity as well as the circumstances of one’s birth. 8 To mention just a 
few examples drawn from the ECtHR’s case law, Article 8 ECHR has 
been said to protect the right of an adult placed as a child and who has 
remained in care until adulthood to consult his personal fi le ( Gaskin v 
 United Kingdom 9 ), the right of a child to identify her father through 
DNA testing ( Mikulic v  Croatia and  Ebrü v  Turkey 10 ), and the right of an 
adult to obtain a post-mortem DNA sampling of his presumed father 
( Jäggi v Switzerland 11 ). So far, however, the ECtHR has paradoxically reject-
 ed the claim that the absolute birth secrecy granted in some European 
countries like France violates Article 8 ECHR ( Odièvre v  France 12 ). 
 The Convention on the Rights of the Child 
 The 1989 CRC is the fi rst human rights convention to contain 
provisions granting explicitly not only the adult’s, but also the child’s 
right to know her origins. 13 There are two important Articles, 7 and 
8. According to Article 7: 
 1) The child shall be registered immediately after birth and shall have 
the right from birth to a name, the right to acquire a nationality and, 
as far as possible, the right to know and be cared for by his or her par-
ents. 
 2) States Parties shall ensure the implementation of these rights in ac-
cordance with their national law and their obligations under the rel-
evant international instruments in this fi eld, in particular where the 
child would otherwise be stateless. 
 This provision repeats to a large extent pre-existing rights to registra-
tion, a name, nationality and care, and in particular the rights guaranteed 
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in Article 24 ICCPR (see  Hodgson, 1993: 256 ). The new right, however, 
under Article 7 is the  right to know and be cared for by one’s parents . This 
right should be interpreted broadly; the term  ‘ parents ’ is said to include 
not only one’s social or legal parents, but also one’s biological or genetic 
parents together with one’s birth parents ( Hodgkin and Newell, 
2002 : 116 – 17;  Freeman, 1996 : 283 – 84;  Masson and Harrison, 1996: 
281 – 82 ). Of course, as we will see, reservations to the contrary were 
made by certain contracting parties, like the UK, the Czech Republic, 
Luxembourg and Poland in particular. These states also insisted on 
introducing the qualifi cation  ‘ as far as possible ’ to justify potential 
national derogations from the right to know. 
 The right to know one’s parents ought to be understood in relation 
to the more general  right to preserve one’s identity . According to Article 8: 
 1) States Parties undertake to respect the right of the child to preserve 
his or her identity, including nationality, name and family relations as 
recognized by law without unlawful interference. 
 2) Where a child is illegally deprived of some or all of the elements of 
his or her identity, States Parties shall provide appropriate assistance 
and protection, with a view to re-establishing speedily his or her iden-
tity. 
 Article 8 is a truly innovative provision. It is the fi rst time an 
international instrument guarantees identity rights, and to children 
(see  Cerda, 1990 ;  Detrick, 1999: 162 ). Its adoption was the result of an 
Argentinean proposal; at the time, Argentina was addressing the disap-
pearance of many children during the 1970s and 1980s. At fi rst, many 
countries opposed this renewed emphasis on the child’s identity that 
seemed superfl uous in view of Article 7. Moreover, it was regarded as 
inconsistent with secret adoption and protecting the identity of gamete 
donors, as they existed in some countries. As a result, a political com-
promise was reached. The provision was retained with the addition of a 
few provisos such as  ‘ without lawful interference ’ ,  ‘ illegally ’ or  ‘ as rec-
ognized by law ’ . Nowadays, however,  ‘ lawful ’ is understood to encom-
pass national as well as international legal norms, so that national legal 
restrictions will not be permitted to contradict international obliga-
tions ( Stewart, 1992 : 225;  Detrick, 1999 : 165;  Van Bueren, 1998: 119 ). 
Moreover, despite the addition of  ‘ as recognized by law ’ to  ‘ family rela-
tions ’ , knowledge of one’s family relations is usually interpreted as 
going beyond knowing one’s legal parents and extends to biological 
and birth parents as well ( Hodgkin and Newell, 2002: 125 ). 
 Despite its apparently innovative nature, Article 8 does not defi ne 
the concept of identity. It gives three examples of what it includes: 
nationality, name and family relations, and in this sense it largely repeats 
Article 7. It is not exhaustive, however, and there are many other aspects 
of the child’s identity which are deemed protected by the provision, for 
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example the child’s personal history, its race, culture, religion, lan-
guage and its physical appearance, abilities and inclinations (see  Hodg-
kin and Newell, 2002 : 125;  Hodgson, 1993: 265 ). 
 B. Distinctions 
 The personal scope of the right 
 a) The right-bearers 
 The importance of the interests protected by the right to know one’s 
origins does not decrease with age. As a consequence, the bearers of 
the right to know one’s origins are children as much as adults. The 
search for one’s origins is indeed part of the search for one’s identity 
and the right to know protects an interest that is as vital to a child as it 
is to an adult. Most national and international guarantees protect the 
right to know one’s origins independently of age. It is the case, for 
instance, of Article 17 ICCPR and of Article 8 ECHR. 14 By contrast, the 
specifi city of Article 24 ICCPR, but most particularly Articles 7 and 8 
CRC in this respect is to focus on the child’s right only. 
 Of course, in practice, the actual means to protect the child’s interest 
to know differ from those to protect an adult’s right. Children are usu-
ally more emotional and less mature, and could be more easily destabi-
lized by certain information. Practices vary therefore from one state to 
the next. Whereas in most European states, children have access only 
to their genetic data once they are eighteen, other states provide an 
immediate access to these data (see  Van Bueren, 1998: 122 – 23 ). In any 
case, the release of information to young children is usually carefully 
controlled according to the child’s best interest (see Article 3 CRC). 
 b) The duty-bearers 
 The main duty-bearer of the child’s right to know her origins is the 
 State . The state should primarily refrain from interfering with the child’s 
right to know. It is also the state which has the means and hence the 
duty to arrange for registration at birth and for the collection and dis-
closure of all relevant data pertaining to a person’s identity. Further-
more, it is usually the state which imposes legal duties under national 
law on individuals like the mother to identify the father or provide her 
own identifi cation, but also which establishes legal sanctions against 
those who breach those horizontal duties. All national and international 
guarantees of the right to know primarily grant rights against the state. 
 To a certain extent, however, one may wonder whether  individuals 
should not also be vested with direct duties pertaining to the right to 
know one’s origins. For instance, the mother of a child knows most 
about the child’s origins, so her cooperation in registering the child is 
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crucial. Most national and international guarantees do not foresee a 
direct horizontal effect of the right to know, but they consider that 
right as vesting the state with negative and positive duties to make sure 
the right is protected against public and private violations ( Besson, 
2005a: 61 ). For instance, Article 7 CRC requires domestic law to make 
registration a compulsory duty both of parents and relevant adminis-
trative authorities. Similarly, Article 8 para 2 CRC suggests that the law 
should penalize those who breach the child’s right to preserve her 
identity. According to the ECtHR’s case law, Article 8 ECHR imposes 
positive duties on the state to prevent inter-individual restrictions of 
the right to know. 15 
 The Material Scope of the Right 
 a) The negative right to know one’s origins v the positive right to 
know one’s origins 
 The right to know one’s origins is usually guaranteed as a negative right 
that protects one’s interests against active violations by state authori-
ties, but also  – and that is most important given the importance of reg-
istering, preserving and opening access to birth data  – as a positive 
right that protects against a passive omission of the state. 
 This is acknowledged by national and international guarantees of 
the right which protect both its negative and positive dimensions. 
Thus, Article 8 ECHR implies duties to register and then to preserve 
the data and make them accessible to the child. 16 Article 7 of the 
CRC makes this even more precise in that it guarantees both the 
positive right to registration at birth and the positive right to preser-
vation of these data for later consultation. When the father is 
unknown, state authorities have a duty to seek his identifi cation (see 
 Hodgkin and Newell, 2002 : Article 7). Article 8 para 2 CRC also 
emphasizes positive duties of assistance and protection to speedily 
re-establish the possibility for a child to preserve her identity. The 
same registration and preservation duties may be derived from 
Article 24 ICCPR. Of course, the scope of positive duties and their 
intensity is more diffi cult to pre-determine than those of negative 
duties. As a result, the margin of appreciation of national authorities 
is broader. 17 Article 8 para 1 CRC, for instance, refers to states  ‘ under-
taking to preserve ’ the child’s identity and Article 8 para 2 CRC 
calls for  ‘ appropriate ’ measures to re-establish the child’s identity 
( Hodgson, 1993: 266 ). 
 b) The right to know one’s parents  v the right to be with one’s parents 
 In principle, the right to know one’s parents does not imply the right 
to meet them and to be with them. Parents might have those duties 
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from other sources, but they are not founded in the same interests of 
the child. Imposing contact on the mother or the father is far more 
demanding than requiring them to be identifi able. Moreover, if the 
right to know one’s parents’ identity refl ects the importance of one’s 
biological ties besides social ones, requiring contact with them would 
rank the former over the latter ( Wallbank, 2004 : 260;  Fortin, 2003 : 
386 – 90; 411 – 13). 
 National and international guarantees of the right to know one’s 
origins do not therefore usually foresee this extension of the right. 
There is an exception in Article 7 CRC, however. This right to contact 
and be cared for by one’s biological parents may be explained by refer-
ence to further interests of the child protected in the Convention. 
Article 7 should indeed be read in light of the rest of the Convention 
and in particular of Articles 9 and 18 CRC, which guarantee the child’s 
right to have a relationship with her parents (see  Fortin, 2003 ). Like 
the right to know, however, the right to be cared for by one’s biological 
parents, besides one’s social parents, is qualifi ed by the words  ‘ as far as 
possible ’ . The burden of proof is nevertheless said to lie on state author-
ities; the Convention’s presumption is indeed that, in ordinary circum-
stances, children are best off with their biological parents (see  Hodgkin 
and Newell, 2002: 119 ). 
 2 .  E N F O R C I N G  T H E  R I G H T :  C O N F L I C T S  O F  R I G H T S 
 Enforcing the child’s right to know her origins implies going further 
than respecting the material and personal scope of the specifi c rights 
and duties it generates. Human rights do not usually arise alone and 
they often enter in confl ict with the other rights and interests with 
which they coexist. Human rights enforcement is therefore to a large 
extent about resolving confl icts of rights and interests, and children’s 
rights’ enforcement is no exception in this regard (see eg,  Eekelaar, 
2006: chap 6 ). 
 To start with,  confl icts of human rights are common. Human rights 
protect fundamental interests and values, which are necessarily plural 
and hence may confl ict with each other. 18 True, many pre-existing con-
fl icts of interests are solved before a right is recognized; their resolu-
tion is precisely what delineates a right’s material scope. Most confl icts 
of rights arise, however, after a right has been recognized and guaran-
teed in a legal instrument; they arise when specifi c rights and duties are 
generated out of an abstract right and hence when they confl ict with 
other specifi c rights and duties ( Besson, 2005c: 426 ). 
 The rights in confl ict with the child’s right to know include the rights 
of the biological mother, the biological father, the mother’s husband, 
the adoptive parents and the gamete donor ( Besson, 2005a: 42 – 3 ). 
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The biological mother could have a fundamental interest to keep 
her identity or that of the biological father secret when giving birth; 
she could have been raped or been the victim of an incestuous rela-
tionship. The biological mother’s husband, who may have brought 
up his wife’s child as his own or even recognized her legally as his 
own, may also have a fundamental interest to keep his social ties to 
the child untouched by identity revelations. Adoptive parents could 
have a similar interest to protect their familial, social and psychologi-
cal ties to the child from the identifi cation of the child’s biological 
parents. Finally, gamete donors may have a sole intention to help out 
sterile couples and not want to become mother or father, and hence 
have a fundamental interest in privacy. Some have argued in this 
respect that one would fi nd less gamete donors if the donation 
secrecy were no longer guaranteed. Other studies show, however, 
that this need not be feared and that once legal claims, such as pater-
nity claims, are excluded, donors remain as interested ( Besson, 
2005a: 43 ). 
 In some cases, the interest of the child may also coincide with that 
of the mother. For instance, when an adulterous or raped mother’s 
life is threatened if she gives birth to a child resulting from that adul-
terous relationship or a rape, the child’s life will also be threatened. 
In those cases, birth secrecy may be said to be the best way to secure 
both the child’s and the mother’s right to life. Moreover, other inter-
ests of the child may confl ict with the child’s right to know her 
origins. In some cases, the child might be better protected by not 
knowing certain elements of her biological origins. Reconciling the 
child’s interest to know with her other interests is diffi cult, however. 
A guiding principle may be found in Article 3 CRC, which makes the 
child’s best interests a primary consideration.  Prima facie , however, 
Article 7 CRC appears to provide much stricter guidelines and be less 
subjective than Article 3. Thus, short-term considerations pertaining 
to the child’s welfare should not take priority over her objective 
moral interests. 19 According to some authors, however, it follows from 
the Convention’s structure that Article 7 CRC should be read in con-
junction with general provisions such as Article 3, thus imposing 
limits on the right to know in cases where the information would be 
blatantly contrary to the child’s best interest (see  Hodgkin and 
Newell, 2002: Chap 7 ). 
 In sum, a concrete balancing of interests will have to take place to 
resolve those various confl icts of rights and interests ( Besson, 2005a: 
66 – 70 ). Of course, this is not to say that abstract guidelines as to how 
to proceed with this balancing are never useful. Abstract hierarchies 
of rights are rare however, and, even when they exist, they cannot 
solve confl icts of rights between rights of equal weight or rights which 
only confl ict with each other in concrete cases and not in others 
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( Besson, 2005c : 426, 437 – 39). As a matter of fact, the diffi culties raised 
by the potential confl ict between the right to know and other rights is 
enhanced by the fact that these rights is usually rights that are ranked 
equally with the child’s right. Moreover, the rights in confl ict are often 
the same on each side. One may think, for instance, of the mother’s 
or the donor’s right to autonomy, right to privacy or freedom of 
expression. 
 True, one may argue that balancing the right to know might lead to 
violating the inner core ( ‘ noyau fondamental ’ or  ‘ Kerngehalt ’ ) of the 
right and hence it becomes devoid of any content. Human rights pro-
tect peripheral and core interests and hence generate specifi c rights 
which lie either at the core or at the periphery of the abstract right. 
One may therefore argue that a human right’s inner core needs to be 
protected against any restriction and hence escape any concrete bal-
ancing with other rights, just as it would pre-empt public interests in 
case of confl ict. 20 This would, for instance, protect the child’s right to 
know in countries where birth  ‘ under X ’ is authorized and hence 
undermines completely, and from the very beginning, the right to 
know who one’s parents are. This objection ignores, however, that 
other competing rights have inner cores as well. Thus, providing the 
right to know priority and hence absolute protection may violate oth-
ers’ rights’ inner core ( Besson, 2005a: 67 – 8 ). Thus, cases where the 
child’s right to know is given absolute abstract priority over the moth-
er’s right to privacy might violate the mother’s right’s inner core. 
Moreover, in case of confl icts of fundamental rights’ inner cores, prag-
matic solutions need to be sought in the balancing of those rights 
( Besson, 2005c : 439 – 43; 451). 
 In a nutshell, balancing cannot be avoided in case of confl ict 
between the child’s right to know and other rights and interests. 
This does not mean, however, that this balancing cannot be guided 
legitimately and effi ciently. Space precludes discussing this issue at 
length here, but generally one may argue that the weighing of con-
fl icting rights is done according to the weight of the specifi c inter-
ests protected in each case. According to the maximization of moral 
reasons requirement, the prioritization of the weightier right over 
the other is possible; 21 mutual restrictions of the rights in confl ict 
are called for by reference to the interests’ respective weight and the 
proportionality principle (see  Besson, 2005c: Chap 12 ). Further 
detailed procedures, authorities and principles can and should be 
developed to adjudicate between the competing interests. It is inter-
esting to examine whether further guiding principles may be found 
in the international human rights instruments presented before and 
how they translate into national concretizations of the right in 
Europe. 
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 3 .  S E E K I N G  G U I D A N C E :  I N T E R N A T I O N A L  P R I N C I P L E S  A N D 
R E V I E W  O F  T H E  R I G H T ’ S  E N F O R C E M E N T 
 In principle, the implementation of international human rights lies 
primarily in the hands of national authorities. In most cases these are, 
however, directly bound by international human rights norms. Adjudi-
cating principles may therefore be found in some of those instruments. 
Among the international bodies concerned with the enforcement of 
the international right to know one’s origins and susceptible to pro-
duce adjudication guidelines, one may mention two  political bodies: the 
UN Committee on Human Rights (CHR) responsible for monitoring 
the enforcement of the ICCPR and the UN Committee on the Rights 
of the Child (CtRc) in charge of monitoring the enforcement of the 
CRC. The third body that will be considered is  judicial : the European 
Court of Human Rights in charge of reviewing national decisions based 
on the ECHR. 
 A. The Committee on Human Rights 
 ICCPR provisions do not provide any guidelines as to how to resolve 
potential confl icts between Articles 17 and 24 ICCPR and other rights. 
 The CHR has produced many recommendations and guidelines as 
to how the right to know one’s origins should be implemented in prac-
tice and under various aspects (see  Detrick, 1999: 145 – 46 ). None of 
them, however, address the confl ict of rights that may emerge between 
the child’s right to know and others’ rights. Nor do they provide crite-
ria as to how to balance confl icting rights in those situations. This 
should come as no surprise given the eminently negative approach to 
the right to privacy often adopted by the Committee ( Van Bueren, 
1995: 45 ). 
 B. The Committee on the Rights of the Child 
 Articles 7 and 8 CRC do not settle the issue of which among the child’s 
interests should prevail in case of confl ict between her interest to know 
her origins and her other interests. Nor do they provide any criteria as 
to how to balance the child’s interests with those of others in case of 
confl ict. In fact, this silence can be interpreted positively. If one refers 
to the Convention’s aim and the general ideology behind it (see eg, 
 Archard, 2002 ;  Besson, 2005b ), it may be said to minimize the impor-
tance of such confl icts. More precisely, based on a holistic approach to 
the Convention, one may even regard Articles 7 and 8 CRC as giving a 
clear and absolute priority to the interests of the child over those of her 
parents ( Van Bueren, 1995 : 49;  Hodgkin and Newell, 2002 : Article 7). 
 True, Article 7 para 1 CRC grants the child a right to know only  ‘ as 
far as possible ’ . The meaning of this proviso is contested. According to 
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some, it means that the right should be implemented as far as it is pos-
sible as a matter of fact. And this in turn would imply that the right to 
know one’s origins is absolute and cannot be conditioned on the respect 
of any other legal duty or right. 22 This interpretation is too limited, 
however. A more complete interpretation is that the right to know is 
granted only as far as this is possible within the limits of the legal order 
and that illegal restrictions to the right to know are prohibited. 23 This 
interpretation accounts for the qualifi cations in Article 7 para 2 and 
Article 8 paras 1 and 2, under which the state’s further obligations 
stemming from national but also from international law are restated. 
What this also means is that other international human rights obliga-
tions may confl ict with the child’s right to know and in particular those 
obligations pertaining to the mother’s or third parties’ rights under 
other national and international instruments. As a result, these con-
fl icts need to be resolved when enforcing the child’s right to know. 
 The CtRC is unlikely, however, to clarify the situation by providing 
criteria and guidelines as to how to balance those confl icting interests. 
There is indeed no mechanism for individual petition under the CRC. 
True, the Committee has had many occasions to make recommenda-
tions regarding incomplete national enforcement of the child’s right 
to know her origins in contracting parties. 24 There is no trace in the 
Committee’s resolution, however, of principles that could guide the 
balancing of the right of the child to know and her best interest or 
other people’s rights, and in particular those of the mother, when the 
confl ict at stake has not been resolved by national authorities to the 
absolute advantage of the parent’s right. As a result, national authori-
ties have a large margin of appreciation provided they do not give abso-
lute priority to the parents’ rights, and do, as we will see, diverge in 
their interpretations of the scope and degree of the duties imposed by 
Articles 7 and 8 CRC ( Hodgson, 1993: 266 ). 
 C. The European Court of Human Rights 
 Article 8 para 2 ECHR expressly recognizes the possibility of restricting 
the right to know one’s origins when it confl icts with other rights. It 
also provides the conditions that need to be respected and hence some 
balancing guidelines. These are legality, the existence of rights or inter-
ests of others and proportionality. One usually adds a fourth condition, 
ie, the respect of the right’s inner core. 
 In its case law, the ECtHR has confi rmed that the right to know one’s 
identity is not absolute. The determination of the extent of the state’s 
positive duties resulting from the right to know one’s origins requires 
balancing that right with others’ rights. 25 When balancing rights, how-
ever, the Court respects the state’s margin of appreciation. The latter is 
particularly broad in matters pertaining to private life and identity. 
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There are indeed many ways  ‘ of ensuring  “ respect for private life ” , and 
the nature of the State’s obligation will depend on the particular aspect 
of private life that is at issue ’ . 26 
 For a long time, the Court was quite respectful of the national margin 
of appreciation in the case of violations of the right to know one’s 
origins. The criterion for considering legal restrictions on the right 
compatible with Article 8 ECHR was, according to the  Mikulic case, that 
the system provides, in the absence of an obligation for presumed fathers 
to submit themselves to a DNA test,  ‘ alternative means enabling an 
independent authority to determine the paternity claim speedily ’ . 27 This 
fl exible approach to balancing culminated in the  Odièvre case. In that 
case, Ms Odièvre argued that the French practice of anonymous ( ‘ under 
X ’ ) birth, and the fact that her mother had been allowed to retain her 
identity from her daughter, infringed Article 8 ECHR. The Court con-
sidered that the possibility that the claimant born  ‘ under X ’ might be 
provided with non-identifying data, together with the provisions of the 
legislation of 2002 authorizing an independent council to waive confi -
dentiality with the mother’s consent, were suffi cient evidence of France’s 
efforts to seek a balance and to ensure suffi cient proportion between 
competing interests. 28 
 The Court’s decision in  Odièvre has been heavily criticized, however. 29 
According to the dissenting judges in the case, the contracting parties’ 
margin of appreciation should not be regarded as exempting the Court 
from its duty to review the way in which the rights had been balanced 
as it did. Moreover, the problem in the decision lay in the fact that 
French law, by giving absolute priority to the right of the mother, who 
retains the right to decide on releasing her information even under the 
legislation of 2002, precludes any balancing of the interests at stake. As 
a result, and without acknowledging it, the Court gave the mother’s 
right absolute priority and hence violated the child’s right’s inner 
core. 30 
 In two 2006 decisions  Ebrü and  Jäggi , the Court has taken those 
critiques seriously and has demonstrated its intention to review very closely 
the weighing-up of the right to know at national level. 31 In the  Jäggi case, 
the Court states that the scope of the state’s margin of appreciation depends 
not only on the abstract right at stake, but also on the specifi c right in ques-
tion and hence on the interest protected in the case at hand. As explained 
above, some interests are more fundamental than others, and hence some 
parts of a right, also referred to as the right’s inner core, are more funda-
mental than others. In  Jäggi , the Court makes the dissenting judges’ opin-
ion in  Odièvre its own. 32 It considers that the right to identity, and hence to 
know one’s origins, belongs to the inner core of the right to respect of 
one’s private life. 33 In such cases, the Court argues, it should review the 
state’s balancing of the rights in confl ict very closely. 34 Applying this close 
scrutiny, the Court judges that Switzerland infringed Article 8 ECHR in 
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refusing an adult man the right to obtain a post-mortem DNA sampling of 
his dead father even though this required exhuming the latter. 
 With its new approach in  Ebrü and  Jäggi , the Court seeks a fair 
equilibrium between the competing rights, instead of granting absolute 
priority to either the child’s right to know or the parents’ right to pri-
vacy. 35 These decisions will remain landmarks in the ECtHR’s case law on 
this question and will require important revisions of certain European 
approaches to the confl ict between the child’s right to know and other’s 
rights. 
 4 .  R E S O L V I N G  C O N F L I C T S :  N A T I O N A L  C O N C R E T I Z A T I O N S 
O F  T H E  R I G H T 
 A. National Concretizations of the International Right to Know 
 The enforcement of the child’s right to know her origins diverges from 
one country to the next in Europe, even though the constitutional and 
legislative guarantees which have gradually emerged since the 1980s 
are often similar (see eg,  Besson, 2005a: 43 ). 
 These divergences are even more surprising as these different 
countries are all bound by the same international guarantees and in 
particular by the ECHR and the CRC. These differences often arise 
from socio-cultural and historical differences which have led to placing 
more weight on certain interests than others when interpreting the 
same international rights (see  O’Donovan, 2000 ; 2002); the broad mar-
gin of appreciation left to member states on these diffi cult issues 
explains divergences. Moreover, given the contrasting paradigms in 
each international instrument’s balancing guidelines and case law, it 
should come as no surprise that priorities are set differently in 
European countries. Thus, the indeterminacy of the  ‘ as far as possible ’ 
proviso in Article 7 para 1 CRC has justifi ed opposite decisions in 
Germany and in Switzerland, as we shall see. It is also the case of Article 
8 ECHR which until recently had been interpreted inconsistently by 
the ECtHR due to the respect for states’ margin of appreciation. Finally, 
divergences in national concretizations of the right to know can also be 
explained by the tension that exists since 2006 between the resolutely 
balanced latest case-law of the ECtHR based on Article 8 ECHR and the 
absolute priority given to the child’s right in the CRC’s guidelines per-
taining to Articles 7 and 8. 
 With respect to tensions  between international obligations pertaining to 
the right to know, Article 60 ECHR phrases a favour principle accord-
ing to which ECHR guarantees are only minimal and according to 
which the ECHR should not be understood as limiting or derogating 
from stronger protection guarantees at national or international level. 
In this sense, Articles 7 and 8 CRC could be interpreted by national 
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authorities as providing greater protection to the child and the abso-
lute protection of the child’s right to know as taking priority over oth-
ers’ rights. The problem is, however, that this is done at the price of the 
inner core of the mother’s right to privacy ( Besson, 2005a: 42 – 3 ). The 
protection granted by those national authorities should not therefore 
be understood as greater protection of a right if it is at the expense of 
another right’s protection. Articles 7 and 8 CRC should as a conse-
quence be interpreted in conformity to Article 8 para 2 ECHR. 
 Similar confl icts may arise  between national guarantees and Articles 7 
and 8 CRC in certain countries or  between them and Article 8 ECHR in others . 
True, such confl icts should not arise in principle given the primacy of 
international (human rights) law over national (constitutional) law. 36 
In most European countries, however, such confl icts are resolved in 
favour of the inner core of a right when it is granted better protection 
in national law. 37 Certain national authorities could therefore regard 
the absolute protection of the right to know’s inner core in national 
law as taking priority over the ECtHR’s more balanced interpretation 
of Article 8 ECHR. In cases where both rights are equally strong, how-
ever, as in the case of the confl ict between the child’s right to know and 
the mother’s right to privacy, and where both inner cores might be 
violated, it is clear that the most balanced resolution of the confl ict of 
rights according to Article 8 para 2 ECHR should be chosen ( Besson, 
2005a: 68 – 70 ). 
 This conclusion in favour of a balanced approach to the enforcement 
of the right to know in national law raises a diffi cult dilemma for 
countries where international or national legal guarantees give 
absolute priority either to the child’s right or to the mother’s. 
 B. Four Examples 
 The four countries discussed in this section can be placed along a 
spectrum that starts from the absolute weight given to the mother’s 
right in France and ends with the absolute priority recognized to the 
child’s right in Switzerland. The UK and Germany are situated at the 
centre of the spectrum with a practice of accommodating all interests 
in presence; a relative priority is often given to the mother in the UK, 
while the child usually gets relative priority over the mother after the 
balancing of rights in Germany (see eg,  O’Donovan, 2002 ). Despite 
original divergences, there has been a perceptible tendency towards 
harmonization in recent years. This is due to international pressure 
and in particular that of the CRC in favour of the child’s right, on the 
one hand and of the ECtHR’s recent case-law in favour of both the 
mother’s and the child’s right, on the other. Among the states which 
made reservations to Articles 7 and 8 CRC in 1989, only Poland, the 
Czech Republic and Luxembourg still guarantee absolute birth secrecy. 
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 France 
 French law does not guarantee the child’s right to know her origins. 
Historically, indeed, maternity and motherhood were regarded as 
clearly separate and a mother could give birth secretly. As a result, there 
was for a long time no right to know one’s origins when the mother or 
a donor had chosen secrecy (see eg,  O’Donovan, 2002 ). Since the CRC 
came into force and under general pressure in Europe, the right to 
give birth anonymously was nuanced in a new law in 2002. True, secret 
birth has not been abolished, but it can be lifted on request of the child 
and with the assent of the mother. Other non-identifying data have also 
been made more readily accessible through independent authorities. 
In 2003, the French practice was deemed compatible with Article 8 
ECHR in the  Odièvre decision discussed above. 38 
 The situation in France has been rightly criticized ever since, 
however. Thus, the CtRC stated that the measures taken by France do 
not fully refl ect the provisions of the Convention. 39 Moreover, critiques 
were also expressed within the ECtHR by dissenting judges in the 
 Odièvre case, who regarded the right to know as entirely sidestepped. 
Interestingly, the most recent ECtHR’s case law on the issue, and in 
particular the  Jäggi decision, has incorporated the dissenting judges’ 
approach; it emphasizes the importance of the balancing of all rights in 
presence without any absolute and abstract priority being given to any 
of them. This renewed willingness to review the national balancing of 
competing rights clearly signals that the  Odièvre case would no longer 
be decided along the same lines today and that French law will most 
probably have to be amended accordingly. 
 UK 
 The child’s right to know her origins is guaranteed under British law. It 
is most particularly the case in adoption law where the adopted child’s 
rights have been well protected since 1975. Moreover, the Access to 
Personal Files (Social Services) Regulations, 1989 for other children 
was adopted as a consequence of the  Gaskin case. The child’s right to 
know is not absolute, however, and has to be balanced against the par-
ent’s or donor’s right when those rights are in confl ict (see eg, 
 O’Donovan, 2002 ). 
 Problems started to emerge in British law when AI was regulated. At 
fi rst, AI children were not granted any right to know their biological par-
ents as the donor’s identity could be kept entirely secret. When the CRC 
came into force, therefore, the UK made a reservation to Article 7 CRC to 
preserve donors’ rights. Only those parents could be regarded as  ‘ parents ’ 
according to Article 7 CRC who, as a matter of national law, are treated as 
parents. 40 Gradually, under European pressure and following the recep-
tion of the Human Rights Act (1998) (see eg,  Herring, 1999 ;  Eekelaar, 
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2002 ; 2006 chaps 3 and 6; Choudry and Fenwick, 2005;  Fortin, 2006 ), a 
revision of the secrecy practice occurred in 2002 (see eg,  Frith, 2001 ). 
Since then the law has been changed and, according to the new regula-
tions entered into force in 2005, the child’s right has to be protected and 
weighed against the donor’s interest (see  Almack, 2006 ;  Wallbank, 2004 ). 41 
In sum, the British approach to the child’s right to know has now turned 
into a non-discriminatory and more balanced one, that duly respects the 
inner core of all competing rights. 
 Germany 
 The child’s right to know her origins has been protected in Germany 
since 1988, when the German Federal Constitutional Court anchored 
this right in the human dignity and personality rights of the German 
Basic Law. 42 
 In recent years, and under the pressure of pro-life groups in particu-
lar, so-called  ‘ baby-fl aps ’ ( ‘ Baby-klappen ’ ) have re-appeared in Germany 
(see eg,  Swientek, 2001 ). As a result, the practice of secret abandon-
ment of children is now tolerated, although it jeopardizes the child’s 
basic right to know about her parentage and hence gives absolute prior-
ity to the mother’s interest in those cases. The justifi cation for this 
restriction to the child’s right to know is said to lie in the  ‘ as far as pos-
sible ’ proviso in Article 7 para 1 CRC and in both the mother and child’s 
right to life which is ranked higher than the right to know by the 
German Basic Law (see  O’Donovan, 2002 ). The CtRC expressed con-
cern about this, but the ECtHR’s decision in  Odièvre indirectly con-
doned the practice. With changes in the ECtHR’s case law, it is highly 
probable that German law will now have to move towards a more bal-
anced adjudication of the confl ict between the interest of the child to 
know and those of the parents. 
 Switzerland 
 The child’s right to know her origins is protected in an absolute fashion 
in Switzerland. This applies to all children equally (see eg,  Besson, 
2005a ;  Aebi-Müller, 2005 ;  Reusser and Schweizer, 2000 ). The question 
has recently received more attention due to the re-emergence of baby-
fl aps in Switzerland. 
 It took around 20 years for the generalization of the right to know one’s 
origins to occur. In the 1980s, the right to know one’s origins was recog-
nized in the federal case law as based on the unwritten right to personal 
freedom. It was then expressly anchored in the federal Constitution in 
1992 and legislation in 1998, but only within the strict framework of the 
regulation of medically assisted reproduction and AI only. It was guaran-
teed as an absolute right of the child. Rapidly, this created inequalities 
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between AI children and adopted children whose right to know their ori-
gins existed but not in an absolute fashion. By that time it had also become 
clear that Article 30 of the 1993 Hague Convention, but most specifi cally 
Articles 7 and 8 CRC, which have direct effect in Swiss law, required adop-
tion law to be amended. Both articles were interpreted by the legislator in 
2003, and by the Swiss Federal Tribunal in 2002, as guaranteeing an abso-
lute right to know one’s origins as far as practically possible. 43 
 In view of the latest evolution in the ECtHR’s case law, the absolute 
approach to the child’s right chosen in Swiss law may now be deemed 
in violation of other fundamental rights, not only national but also 
international ( Besson, 2005a: 69 – 70 ). The ECtHR’s recent decision in 
 Jäggi shows how Swiss authorities may be condemned for not having 
suffi ciently balanced the father’s right against those of his child. The 
reverse should also be true, however, and a fair balancing of rights 
should occur in all cases. Accordingly, the 2002 Swiss Federal Tribu-
nal’s case law that gives absolute priority to the child’s right to know, 
although based partly on Article 7 CRC, will have to be revised to 
respect the balancing requirement under Article 8 ECHR. 
 5 .  A  P R O P O S A L   Q U A  C O N C L U S I O N 
 The increasing legal recognition since the 1980s of the child’s right to 
know her origins has been a clear progress that guarantees the child’s 
vital interest in identity against her parents’ rights to privacy or auton-
omy. This article has argued, however, that that right should not be 
granted absolute protection as it threatens to or is actually already 
threatening parents’ rights in some European countries. On the con-
trary, a careful balancing should take place in each concrete case to 
make sure both the child’s and her parents’ interests are taken into 
account. 
 Although concrete balancing is necessary to avoid the absolutism of 
abstract solutions, abstract balancing guidelines can and should be 
developed both at national and international level ( Besson, 2005a : 70; 
 Besson, 2005c : chap 12;  Eekelaar, 2006: chap 6 ). First of all, specifi c 
national authorities should be established that offer the guarantees of 
independence and the know-how needed to balance the interests in 
issue. 44 Most European countries now constitute independent adminis-
trative bodies of that kind. Second, procedures before these authorities 
should be clear and speedy so as to ease the resolution of substantive 
questions whose complexity prevents an abstract solution. 45 Moreover, 
burdens of proof could be alleviated in certain conditions as, for instance, 
when the child is badly affected or ill or when the mother’s life is in dan-
ger. Finally, balancing criteria should be carefully identifi ed. More par-
ticularly, principles of legality, proportionality 46 and the existence of 
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rights or interests of others should be strictly respected so as to frame 
the balancing. 47 Additionally, the inner core of each right should be 
guaranteed in an absolute fashion, so as to preclude  ex ante  ‘ under X ’ 
birth practices or baby-fl aps. 
 The fi nal aim in the enforcement of the child’s right to know her 
origins should be to reduce the growing gap between her biological, 
social and legal identities. While the latter’s distinct existence ought to 
be openly acknowledged, their complementarity should also be revealed 
once they are about to be known. Only so will each individual child be 
able to live a coherent albeit truthful existence. This has a price, how-
ever: openly balancing the rights of all individuals concerned in the 
child’s identity-constitution process. 
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